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Monthly Geopolitical Report: August 2026

by ZeroFox Intelligence
Monthly Geopolitical Report: August 2026
18 minute read

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 12:30 AM (EDT) on July 30, 2026; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.1

Key Findings

  • Three simultaneous conflicts—the war in Iran, the Russia-Ukraine war, and Iran-allied Houthi attacks in the Red Sea—are converging. The impacts of these overlapping conflicts are very likely to ripple through global supply chains.
  • The ceasefire between the United States and Iran has effectively collapsed. The drop in oil prices to pre-war levels over the last month likely contributed to the resumption in Iranian hostilities. Deteriorating economic conditions are therefore likely to coerce the United States to return to negotiations. Even with a return to negotiations and a halt in the airstrikes, the broader uncertainty is very unlikely to end; the most likely scenario in the near term is a version of the ceasefire that breaks down periodically.
  • U.S. Customs and Border Patrol will collect duties of 10 or 12.5 percent on imports from most major trading partners. The tariffs are only marginally lower than the rates announced back in April 2025; however, the reaction from global markets has been significantly more muted. Because these tariffs have more sound legal footing and do not expire, businesses likely feel more comfortable planning investments.
  • Political transition talks in Venezuela begin in August but are likely to stall; therefore, the current political status quo will likely persist.
  • In India, influential student-led protests in July have subsided following government concessions, but this calm is unlikely to persist given the country's broader, unresolved economic issues.

Middle East

Ceasefire Collapses, Conflict Widens

Iran and the United States resumed reciprocal attacks in mid-July, with the United States striking hundreds of alleged Iranian military targets over 13 consecutive days ending on July 252. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on U.S. military bases in the region3.  Fighting paused on July 25 after the United States suspended strikes. However, it resumed again on July 29, when Iran launched missiles at U.S. bases in Jordan after U.S. and Saudi authorities claimed to have collaborated on strikes against Iran-aligned militias in Iraq. Saudi Arabian authorities claimed their strikes on Iraqi militias were in response to foiled drone attacks targeting Saudi oil installations on July 28, which are reported to have originated in Iraq4. The reciprocal strikes were a rare example of direct Saudi involvement in the conflict. U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to resume U.S. strikes on Iran in response to the Jordan attack.

  • Tactics: U.S. strikes largely targeted Iranian coastal and naval sites—almost certainly to limit Iran’s ability to attack ships in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). With the ceasefire effectively over, Iran will likely utilize the same techniques it employed during the war's opening stages from late February to May, primarily targeting commercial shipping in the SoH, as well as Gulf states and U.S. and allied assets across the region5.
  • Economy: Iran is likely to leverage its ability to elevate economic costs, through both blockades of the SoH and attacks on Gulf assets as it did before. Maintaining leverage over the key Middle Eastern industries that utilize the SoH is almost certainly part of Iran's strategy to end the conflict on terms it finds acceptable.
    • Throughout the initial stages of the conflict, the United States repeatedly demonstrated its preoccupation with deteriorating economic conditions. On several occasions, President Trump abruptly postponed threatened strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure, which was interpreted as an acknowledgement that he was looking to end the war6. There is a roughly even chance that the relative lack of economic pressure contributed to the U.S. willingness to resume hostilities in mid-July. With economic indicators now trending negative again, the Trump administration is likely to encourage negotiations.
    • An expansion of U.S. targeting to include Iranian civilian critical infrastructure, which was largely spared during the initial hostilities, is likely an indication that the U.S. calculus has shifted and the Trump administration is prepared for a more prolonged conflict in spite of the almost certain economic damage.
  • Proxies and War Expanding Across Middle East: Besides involvement from Iraqi militias, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi militia has also entered the conflict with a blockade of Saudi ports in the Red Sea. This threatens to further disrupt already stretched oil supplies and is likely to force the United States to decide whether to divide its forces to target two different blockades78.

Europe

Political Risks as Ukraine Seeks to Drive Home Advantages Against Russia

Sizable shifts in both Ukraine’s political and battlefield spheres drove the most notable activity in the conflict in July and are likely to continue to influence the conflict in the long term. On the political side, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a government reshuffle on July 12, which resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko and her cabinet. Naftogaz CEO Serhii Koretskyi will take over as prime minister, reportedly focusing on preparing Ukraine’s electrical grid for the upcoming winter9. 

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, Ukraine launched an unprecedented seaborne drone campaign that greatly restricted Russia’s freedom of movement and altered global supply chains. On July 5, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces began targeting Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov; this campaign was expanded to the Black Sea by mid-month. As of July 22, Ukrainian forces claimed strikes on roughly 196 Russian vessels in the region10. The campaign has effectively halted all traffic in the Sea of Azov and prompted Russia to restrict operations at its Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a key grain export hub11. Russia responded in kind, intensifying strikes on Odesa and Chornomorsk that have cost Ukraine an estimated one-third of its Black Sea export capacity, which is also a key grain export route12. The net effect is a mutual chokehold on maritime commerce between two of the world’s leading grain exporters, driving continuous increases in global prices13.

  • Government Reshuffle: The changes in government represented the fourth government overhaul in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion began in 2022. The move likely aims to inject renewed energy into foreign policy, as Zelensky tries to position Ukraine as a capable and critical defense partner to Europe and the United States.
  • Protests: However, the reshuffle included the dismissal of the highly popular Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who was replaced with intelligence official Yevhenii Khmara14. The dismissal reportedly stemmed from intractable differences between Fedorov and Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi. Fedorov’s dismissal triggered the largest wartime protests since 2025, demanding Zelensky reinstate Fedorov and remove Syrskyi. The demonstrations ultimately prompted Zelensky to remove Syrskyi on July 21 and replace him with Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, the favored choice of protesters15. Drapatyi's appointment likely stabilizes the situation in the near term and preserves the innovation agenda protesters rallied behind, but Zelensky will likely still face pressure to reinstate Fedorov. 
  • Fighting Style: Fedorov is the face of Ukraine’s successful drone industry, but the personnel churn reflects an wider unresolved contest between an asymmetric, technology-driven wartime fighting style and a conventional, Soviet one—a fault line that has almost certainly run through Ukraine's leadership since the beginning of the conflict. This struggle will likely persist and continue to influence high-level appointments in the long term.
  • Energy:  The campaign also spilled over into oil markets after Kazakhstan was forced to halt Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil loadings at Novorossiysk on July 21. The CPC route handles about 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, which are dominated by Western-backed producers. Pressure from those producers reportedly prompted the Trump administration to formally warn Ukraine against striking non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea16. CPC loadings then resumed on July 2717. 
  • Supply Chains: Ukraine's economic-warfare strategy is proving effective precisely because it disrupts globally integrated supply chains, but that same reach is now reportedly generating friction with the United States. The Trump administration likely has a limited appetite for market disruption amid parallel instability stemming from the Iran conflict. Ukraine will likely calibrate future Black Sea operations to avoid alienating the United States, introducing a ceiling on the campaign's scope.

Americas

Tariffs Return in July and August 2026

Effective July 24, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol will apply tariffs of 10 percent or 12.5 percent to imports from 60 trading partners. These tariffs follow a Section 301 investigation, which found that targeted countries failed to effectively prevent goods made with forced labor from entering the United States18. The new tariffs replace the temporary Section 122 tariffs implemented by President Trump in February, after the Supreme Court struck down duties he imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act19. Since these new tariffs replace the temporary 10 and 12 percent Section 122 tariffs expiring on July 24, the effective rate will rise by only 0.5 percent20.

  • Looking Forward: Further tariffs are still likely. The Office of the United States Trade Representative is still conducting a Section 301 probe into global manufacturing capacity, which could end with new tariffs as early as August 202621. In the days leading up to the tariffs, the White House announced a 50 percent tariff on about USD 20 billion worth of Canadian imports (effective August 19) and gave generic drug manufacturers two years to move production to the United States or face a 100 percent duty starting in August 2028. On July 22, 25 percent tariffs on imports from Brazil took effect. Separately, President Trump threatened new tariffs on goods from the European Union (EU) in retaliation for a USD 1 billion fine imposed on Google. Taken together, the Section 301 tariffs, other country-specific tariffs, and threats of tariffs very likely signal the current U.S. administration is seeking to install hefty tariffs over the long term.
  • Economic Impact: When President Trump announced the "Liberation Day" tariffs on April 2, 2025, global stock markets declined and bond yields surged. While current tariffs are only marginally lower, with an effective global rate of 11 percent compared to Liberation Day's 14 percent, market reaction has been muted—likely due to a perception that tariff escalation has peaked, the implementation of legal guardrails, and a more modest inflationary impact. The Supreme Court ruling that invalidated the "Liberation Day" tariffs forced the Trump administration to adopt more legally sound and predictable trade practices. For instance, the recent Section 301 tariffs followed a six-month investigation, contrasting with the unexpected rates of the previous policy. This predictability very likely facilitates better business planning, as these tariffs have more sound legal footing and do not expire.
    • Furthermore, the 2025 tariffs proved less inflationary than anticipated. Many companies, bound by long-term contracts, could not immediately pass on costs, forcing a delay in price adjustments. Others opted for gradual price increases to mitigate immediate spikes. As this gradual pass-through of tariff costs continues, a long-term period of moderate, tariff-related inflation is expected.

Venezuela: Political Transition Talks Starting in August 2026

U.S.-backed political negotiations aimed at charting a path to future Venezuelan elections are set to begin in the capital of Caracas on August 1, but they will start without the full backing of either the opposition or the ruling coalition. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on July 21 that the interim government agreed to a format and a forum—not just for reconciliation talks with opposition parties but also to begin the transition process, which would end in elections22. 

The opposition is reportedly being led by Dinorah Figuera, who returned to Venezuela from eight years of exile with U.S. backing and has already met with Interim President Delcy Rodríguez's brother, Jorge Rodríguez. However, the most popular member of the opposition, María Corina Machado, said on July 26 that she was not involved in the talks. 

  • Exposed Splits: Hardline pro-government figures rallied in Caracas on July 24, burning U.S. flags and dismissing the negotiations as illegitimate. Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello welcomed the talks the same week, insisting "dialogue doesn't mean capitulation," likely signaling the Venezuelan government will countenance talks as long as they do not present a serious likelihood of them losing power. On the opposition side, Machado said she will not "stand in the way of any initiative that produces real progress"; however, having Figuera lead the bloc representing the opposition instead of Machado is likely a sign that both the United States and the incumbent Venezuelan government prefer to meet with Figueroa23. Machado supporters will likely view talks suspiciously as a result.
  • Looking Forward: It is likely the August talks produce procedural movement (electoral council appointments, voter-registry discussion) without a firm election date, given Machado's exclusion from direct participation and visible hardliner resistance inside the ruling coalition.
  • Economy: These negotiations will likely be shaped by Venezuela's deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation as it recovers from late June earthquakes that claimed over 5,200 lives24. Public perception of the transition talks will depend on the incumbent administration's response to these challenges; inadequate efforts will almost certainly erode public sentiment, while successful economic recovery—including restoring the oil industry and distributing profits—likely bolsters its standing. Conversely, continued deterioration would likely favor the Machado camp.

Colombia: Tense Presidential Transition on August 7

On August 7, 2026, president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella will take office following a narrow victory against Iván Cepeda, candidate of the ruling Historic Pact coalition and key ally to current President Gustavo Petro. Public tensions between the incoming and outgoing governments following de la Espriella’s victory, which involved allegations of electoral fraud by President Petro, led the president-elect to temporarily suspend the transition process in early July and accuse the outgoers of planning a “coup d’etat” to stay in power2526. After weeks of uncertainty, both governments resumed negotiations on July 22, 2026, and agreed to follow “Ley 951 de 2005”—a law that dictates the rules and norms of a stable transition of power in the Colombian government2728.

  • Congressional Split: Ahead of de la Espriella’s ascension to power, Colombia’s Congress is divided into several blocs with no absolute majority29. The Historic Pact coalition retains significant congressional representation despite its exit from power, remaining the biggest bloc both in the Senate and the Chamber. De la Espriella will be the first Colombian President without a consolidated bloc in Congress because his party, Defensores de la Patria, is not yet legally recognized30. With no clear congressional majority, the soon-to-be incumbent will very likely need to build effective relationships with conservative partners to successfully pass his promised radical economic and security reforms. Nonetheless, if tensions between the incoming and outgoing governments remain, the Historic Pact coalition will likely work against the conservative side by building an opposition bloc that will almost certainly stall the passing of key reforms by de la Espriella and his allies. De la Espriella’s success in Congress almost certainly relies on his ability to build a functional relationship with parties such as Democratic Center and Liberal Party to combat the prospective opposition by the Historic Pact coalition.
  • Looking Forward: The first major challenge to the new government will likely surface in the upcoming budget negotiations scheduled between September and October 2026, as de la Espriella will very likely aim for public sector cuts—which will likely cause friction with multiple Congress members if said cuts potentially affect their own governing regions31. De la Espriella’s other initiatives include tough-on-crime measures to reduce drug-related violence and closer ties with the United States. Together with opposing political parties organizing demonstrations against the new government, these initiatives also come with the risk of anti-American social unrest and an increase in violent confrontations with criminal groups.

Asia

India: Youth-Led Protests Likely to Remain in August 2026

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a youth-led online movement demanding education reforms from India’s government, led a weekslong protests throughout the country that culminated in the resignation of India’s education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, on July 25. It is a rare instance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government giving in to protester demands. The protests attracted modest turnout when they first began in June but saw significantly more participation beginning on July 20 after police used harsh tactics to disrupt a planned march to the Parliament building32. The gathering grew in the ensuing days, and a second march on Parliament on July 22 resulted in the temporary suspension of the chamber’s functions33.

One of the inciting incidents for the protests was reportedly the online leak of documents pertaining to India’s government-issued medical school exam, which nullified the results of over two million testees. Such leaks are not uncommon in India, where some university graduates complain of high unemployment and difficulty finding work34.

  • Education: Following Pradhan’s resignation, the CJP called an end to the protest, stating its goals had been met. Prime Minister Narendra Modi also announced plans to reform India’s examination system35. College examinations are a significant issue in India, where answer leaks have required prospective students to retake tests with new questions. However, since the ousting of Pradhan, the protesters have issued new demands (mainly related to police brutality and criminal charges against them). 
  • Further Protests: Additional protests are all but certain, especially if Modi’s reforms do not satisfy the demands of movement leaders or the government is perceived as reneging on its promises36. It will very likely be several months until prospective reforms are announced. 
  • Economic Grievances: Although student-led, these protests underscored widespread economic discontent among India’s youth, who face dim employment prospects. As these underlying frustrations persist, further unrest is all but certain; there is a roughly even chance that agricultural groups and farmers will drive the next wave of demonstrations.

Africa

Ebola Epidemic Now Largest in DRC History

The Ebola epidemic underway in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is almost certain to become the largest in the DRC’s history. As of July 26, 2026, 3,200 cases have been reported—just under the 3,470 recorded during the 2018–2020 epidemic. With 800 cases recorded over the course of the week of July 20–26, it is almost certain that this marker will be passed by July 3137.

While international medical assistance has flooded to the most affected areas in Ituri Province and neighboring regions, this aid has not yet slowed the epidemic. The area is difficult to travel to, and resources are slow to arrive on the ground.

  • Looking Forward: The outbreak has remained localized to the eastern DRC, with few cases spilling over the border into Uganda. That country declared its outbreak over on July 28, after two deaths and 18 recoveries38. The outbreak in Uganda was related to travel from the affected one of the DRC. Due to features of the disease, it is very unlikely to spread past eastern DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan (where no cases have yet been observed). There is almost no chance of an outbreak in the Western world or other developed countries. Occasional single infections, primarily of medical professionals working in the Ebola zone, may occur and result in evacuation to hospitals in developed nations. During the 2013–2015 outbreak in West Africa, four Americans were flown to hospitals in the United States. Nevertheless, travel will likely be more difficult across the wider continent, with governing authorities likely implementing travel restrictions.

Zambia: Elections on August 13, 2026 

Zambia’s parliamentary and presidential elections will take place August 13, 2026, and President Hakainde Hichilema of the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) is likely to win a second term. Hichilema will likely face a strong challenge from opposition leader Brian Mundubile of the Patriotic Front and (more broadly) the Tonse Alliance, which involves Zambian political parties opposing the UPND3940.

The vote is shaping up to be a referendum on Hichilema’s economic record since he took office in 2021. As of June 2026, annual inflation has decreased to 6.5 percent—the lowest in eight years and a figure Hichilema is campaigning on41. Despite this statistic, the opposition argues the government's achievements have done little to improve ordinary Zambians’ lives, putting the rising cost of living and unemployment at the center of electoral issues42. 

  • Economic Outlook and IMF Support: Zambia is Africa’s second largest copper producer and has benefited from economic growth supported by high copper prices. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Zambia’s economy is set to grow 4.3 percent this year, from 3.8 percent in 2025, and foreign investment has reportedly picked up in the country’s mining, energy, and agricultural sectors. That said, the opposition challenges that the recovery has not reached Zambian households. In 2024, approximately 72 percent of citizens reportedly had no or irregular access to electricity supply43. A second term with Hichilema will likely preserve close cooperation with the IMF, Western partners, and international investors while maintaining good relations with China.
  • U.S. Imperatives: Zambia plays an outsized role in the U.S. government focus towards Africa, as it is one of the world’s leading copper and cobalt producers. On July 24, 2026, the Trump administration unveiled a USD 500 million U.S.-Africa Strategic Investment Program aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains and expanding U.S. business opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa44. The policy encourages alternative processes and refining capacity, reducing minerals reliance on China, and very likely reflects how the United States will engage with the African continent. Rather than securing partnerships via direct foreign aid and allowing the U.S. private sector to develop relations in the energy and mining sectors, the U.S. government is taking a leading role in augmenting private sector investment while largely abandoning its aid commitments.

Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale 

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

  1. Report Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide monthly updates on significant geopolitical occurrences and logistics developments, as well as potential impacts to the global supply chain.
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  2. ZeroFox Flash Report: Ceasefire Collapse Likely Temporary – SITREP #42: July 15, 2026 ↩︎
  3. hXXps://www.bbc[.]com/news/articles/c74gwdzywmeo ↩︎
  4. hXXps://www.kcra[.]com/article/us-more-strikes-against-iran-a-new-stage-of-war/73303764 ↩︎
  5. ZeroFox Flash Report: Ceasefire Collapse Likely Temporary – SITREP #42: July 15, 2026 ↩︎
  6. ZeroFox Flash Report: Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #28: March 25, 2026 ↩︎
  7. hXXps://www.ndtvprofit[.]com/world/400-000-barrels-a-day-halted-saudi-aramco-shuts-jazan-refinery-post-houthi-attack-11834746 ↩︎
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  9. hXXps://kyivindependent[.]com/ukrainian-parliament-appoints-koretskyi-as-prime-minister/ ↩︎
  10. hXXps://t[.]me/robert_magyar ↩︎
  11. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/russia-bans-night-vessel-movement-novorossiysk-port-industry-sources-say-2026-07-22/ ↩︎
  12. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/ukraines-black-sea-ports-lose-third-grain-export-capacity-farmers-union-says-2026-07-15/ ↩︎
  13. hXXps://live.euronext[.]com/en/product/commodities-futures/EBM-DPAR ↩︎
  14. hXXps://www.bbc[.]com/news/articles/cdx76069n3do ↩︎
  15. hXXps://www.facebook[.]com/reel/27821642997525867 ↩︎
  16. hXXps://www.kyivpost[.]com/post/81066 ↩︎
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  18. hXXps://ustr[.]gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/FLIP%20301%20Investigation%20Final%20Action%20FRN%207-23-26%20FINAL.pdf ↩︎
  19. hXXps://www.supplychaindive[.]com/news/us-imposes-tariffs-over-forced-labor-before-global-duty-ends/825951/
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  20. hXXps://www.bloomberg[.]com/news/articles/2026-06-03/trump-tariffs-why-us-is-invoking-forced-labor-for-new-import-levies ↩︎
  21. hXXps://www.supplychaindive[.]com/news/ustr-section-301-investigation-manufacturing-production-capacity/814549/
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  22. hXXps://english.elpais[.]com/international/2026-07-21/marco-rubio-says-venezuelas-democratic-transition-will-begin-in-early-august.html ↩︎
  23. hXXps://www.bloomberg[.]com/news/articles/2026-07-27/venezuela-democracy-talks-backed-by-us-to-start-despite-division ↩︎
  24.  hXXps://www.euronews[.]com/2026/07/25/the-toll-of-the-tragedy-one-month-after-venezuelas-double-earthquake ↩︎
  25. hXXps://www.dw[.]com/es/de-la-espriella-suspende-transici%C3%B3n-con-el-gobierno-de-petro/a-77866242 ↩︎
  26. hXXps://www.nbcnews[.]com/world/latin-america/colombia-president-elect-abelardo-de-la-espriella-gustavo-petro-coup-rcna353365 ↩︎
  27. hXXps://www.radiosantafe[.]com/2026/07/22/reanudan-reuniones-de-empalme-entre-gustavo-petro-y-abelardo-de-la-espriella-para-la-posesion-del-7-de-agosto/ ↩︎
  28. hXXps://www.funcionpublica[.]gov[.]co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=16161 ↩︎
  29. hXXps://www.portafolio[.]co/economia/gobierno/asi-quedo-repartido-el-nuevo-congreso-hacia-donde-se-inclinan-las-mayorias-que-definiran-que-proyectos-se-aprueban-498564 ↩︎
  30. hXXps://www.infobae[.]com/colombia/2026/07/25/movimiento-politico-defensores-de-la-patria-de-abelardo-de-la-espriella-estaria-cerca-de-obtener-su-personeria-juridica-en-el-cne/ ↩︎
  31. hXXps://www.elheraldo[.]co/politica/2026/07/19/mayorias-en-el-papel-tensiones-en-la-practica-el-reto-legislativo-de-abelardo-de-la-espriella/ ↩︎
  32. hXXps://www.bbc[.]com/news/articles/c98v349r9lro ↩︎
  33. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/india/under-soaring-pressure-indias-education-minister-promises-reforms-debate-2026-07-22/
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  34. hXXps://www.thehindu[.]com/society/cjp-delhi-students-protest-neet-exam-leak-police-violence-gen-z/article71251972.ece ↩︎
  35. hXXps://www.dw[.]com/en/india-news-modi-announces-task-force-to-reform-exams/live-78117719 ↩︎
  36. hXXps://www.theguardian[.]com/world/2026/jul/28/india-cockroach-janta-party-cjp-demands-protesters-release ↩︎
  37. hXXps://www.rfi[.]fr/fr/afrique/20260727-ebola-en-rdc-avec-3200-cas-d%C3%A9j%C3%A0-confirm%C3%A9s-la-17e-%C3%A9pid%C3%A9mie-proche-du-total-de-celle-de-2018-2020 ↩︎
  38. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/ugandas-health-minister-declares-country-free-ebola-2026-07-28/ ↩︎
  39. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/africa/zambia-election-will-put-hichilemas-economic-record-test-2026-07-09/
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  40. hXXps://lansinginstitute[.]org/2026/07/28/zambias-2026-parliamentary-elections-strategic-outlook-and-implications-for-domestic-stability-and-foreign-influence/ ↩︎
  41. hXXps://www.zamstats[.]gov[.]zm/annual-inflation-june-2025-june-2026/ ↩︎
  42. hXXps://www.facebook[.]com/trtafrika/videos/election-campaigns-in-zambia-heat-up-as-president-hakainde-hichilema-eyes-a-seco/1362559845979629/ ↩︎
  43. hXXps://issafrica[.]org/iss-today/elections-2026-is-zambia-s-democratic-success-story-beginning-to-fray ↩︎
  44. hXXps://africa.businessinsider[.]com/local/markets/trump-takes-his-africa-strategy-a-step-further-with-first-dedicated-dollar500-million/5tert9d ↩︎

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