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Threat Intelligence

Monthly Geopolitical Report: November 2026

A-2026-10-30a
ZeroFox Intelligence
TLP:CLEAR
Monthly Geopolitical Report: November 2026
21 minute read

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 11:50 AM (EDT) on October 29, 2026; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.1

Key Findings

  • The United States and Israel are likely to resume airstrikes on Iran after the U.S. midterm elections on November 3. In the run-up to the expected resumption of hostilities, Iran has been escalating its attacks, likely to signal the economic damage it is capable of causing to Gulf economies and global energy markets.
  • Given that parties opposed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are forecasted to hold nearly 70 seats in the Knesset, it is unlikely that the prime minister will be able to form a government without a new election.
  • As the U.S. relationship with Ukraine deteriorates, Russia will likely escalate conventional military operations to exploit gaps in Ukraine’s defenses. This escalation will likely coincide with intensified hybrid activity by Russian actors targeting the European Union (EU) because it remains Ukraine’s sole major backer of consequence.
  • France is the key European country facing protest movements currently, which were very likely inspired by protests in Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal.
  • The United States will hold mid-term elections on November 3, 2026. A contested outcome—wherein control is undecided on election night or determined by a handful of narrow wins—is very likely the highest-risk scenario for politically motivated violence and localized unrest.
  • U.S., Chinese, and Russian leaders are due to meet at the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in November. Major developments regarding U.S.-China trade tensions or Russia’s war in Ukraine are very unlikely; it is more likely the leaders will attend those summits for further discussion opportunities.
  • The ongoing civil war in Ethiopia suggests that Tigrayan forces are likely more divided and less capable than they have been historically. Ethiopian forces are likely stronger than in the previous conflict. However, the latest fighting demonstrates Ethiopia’s relative isolation—a stark reversal from the earlier conflict, when Tigrayan forces lacked external allies.

Middle East

Iran War Likely to Resume after U.S. Mid-Terms as Houthis and Iran Escalate

The United States and Israel are likely to resume airstrikes on Iran after the U.S. mid-term elections targeting Iran’s weapons and nuclear sites and oil facilities, which have largely been avoided thus far in the conflict. In the run-up to the expected resumption of hostilities, Iran has been escalating its attacks, likely to signal the economic damage it is capable of causing to Gulf economies and global energy markets.

Since October 1, Iran has launched its highest number of drone and anti-ship missile attacks on commercial shipping since the war began in March 2026. Iran is likely escalating its attacks to target a wider array of assets across a broader geographic area. This pattern suggests an effort by Iran to sustain elevated oil prices and pressure the United States to abandon its policy to increase Strait of Hormuz (SoH) transits.

On October 5, the internationally recognized government of Yemen, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—backed by Saudi airpower—launched an offensive to recapture territory lost to Houthi rebels.2 This offensive has likely stalled, while Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, PLC territory, and the Red Sea have increased. These attacks are likely designed to pressure Saudi Arabia into pursuing a political settlement.

In this instance, the core Houthi aim likely overlaps with Iranian interests: mainly to maintain upward pressure on oil prices to achieve political concessions. Therefore, a de-escalation in the U.S.-Iran conflict or Houthi losses would likely strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position. Conversely, a political solution between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis that lowers oil prices would likely weaken Iran’s position.

SoH Impacts: Absent a diplomatic solution, Iran will likely target exports through the SoH, including ship-to-ship transfers. Outgoing vessels from the SoH very likely face the highest risk, although Iran will likely expand the geographic zone of its attacks. There is a roughly even chance Iran expands its targeting outside the immediate SoH to include ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.

Outside Intervention: Saudi Arabia is likely pressuring other external actors to join its effort to back the Yemeni government. Turkey and Pakistan, which recently signed a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia,3 are likely participating through intelligence sharing, drone support, and air operations. Saudi Arabia is also likely pressuring additional actors to contribute, including potential ground troops from the United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Egypt.45 Escalation by the United States or Israel against the Houthis remains possible, especially if Houthi attacks continue to influence oil prices. Further entry by outside actors into the Houthi conflict will likely lead to an escalation in Houthi attacks—both on Red Sea shipping and against regional states.

Oil Impacts: The Houthis are likely avoiding Saudi energy infrastructure to prevent triggering a larger price spike that would increase the probability of direct U.S. intervention. Should the United States enter into direct conflict with the Houthis—or should Saudi Arabia expand its military operations—the Houthis would very likely respond by broadening their targeting to include Saudi energy facilities and shipping vessels in the Red Sea. Because Houthi attacks have successfully influenced oil prices without directly targeting the energy sector, this very likely demonstrates that further Houthi escalation would impact oil prices even more significantly.

Oil prices have largely remained elevated, despite increased Middle East oil supplies. This is likely a reflection of multiple factors, including the high cost of refining energy products and added shipping costs; however, it is also most likely a reflection that Iran and its allies and proxies will escalate through other avenues to achieve the same aims. This includes striking stationary targets such as ports, pipelines, and oil fields in Gulf countries, which have largely been spared so far, and expanding the war to commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Israel: Election Impasse Likely to Continue into November 2026

As the final votes continue to be tallied in the Israeli general election, it appears that the government of Prime Minister Netanyahu will fall several seats short of the 61 needed to maintain a majority in Israel’s Knesset. This is despite the fact that his Likud party outperformed polling expectations and garnered the most seats.

However, the main opposition bloc, which is led by Gadi Eisenkot and his centrist Yashar party, slightly underperformed and is also forecast to have won well less than a majority, at approximately 50 seats. Meanwhile, the Arab-majority parties, Ra’am (United Arab List) and the Joint List, are set to gain around 17-19 seats, a historic high that allows them to propel either grouping to power.67

In this vein, both the head of Ra’am and the Joint List have stated that they are ready and willing to join the opposition faction to form a government.89 Nonetheless, Eisenkot has not signaled his readiness to join in a coalition with the Arab-dominated political blocs. Furthermore, other prominent members of the opposition, including Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett, stated in the run-up to the election that they will refuse to sit in government with the Joint List and Ra’am.10 The Arab parties could (but so far appear unlikely to) prop up a minority opposition government by providing “outside support,”11 but such arrangements in Israel are historically rare.

Looking forward: Once the tallies are finalized, the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, will decide whom to designate to form the next government. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether that will be Netanyahu or the opposition. And should either side fail, the other will then be given the opportunity. Regardless, a successful coalition will likely take several weeks to form, as the law allows for up to 38 days of negotiations for the first party designate and 28 days for the second.1213 Should the process drag on for months, new elections would likely be triggered. Given that parties opposed to Netanyahu are forecasted to hold nearly 70 seats, it is unlikely that the prime minister will be able to form a government without a new election—a clear opening for the opposition.

Europe

Ukraine Announces Restart of Attacks on Russian Refineries

Energy policy continued to drive diplomatic and military developments in October. On October 11, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump called for a ceasefire on energy infrastructure, likely in an attempt to drive down global oil prices. Ukraine stated it would comply, provided Russia observed the same restrictions, and subsequently paused strikes on Russian refineries for three days. On October 14, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine would resume targeting, citing continued Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.14 This episode follows previously observed patterns wherein Ukraine commits to Western proposals for reduced hostilities to appease its partners, while Russia continues unabated attacks. Ukraine subsequently struck refineries in Russia’s Ryazan and Saratov regions on October 15, followed by a strike on Gazprom’s condensate plant near Surgut in Khanty-Mansi, a record 2,340 kilometers from Ukraine.15 The Khanty-Mansi strikes marked the first successful attack on energy infrastructure in Russia’s largest oil-producing region and were likely intended to signal Ukraine’s persistent capability to strike deep within Russian territory following the brief pause in targeting.

Preceding the disputed ceasefire, on October 9, President Trump announced that Russia agreed to supply the United States and global markets with nearly five million tons of diesel fuel over the coming six months, with deliveries of 300,000 tons expected to begin in November.16 Trump followed this announcement with an executive order on October 16 that waived key provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, pausing secondary sanctions on top buyers of Russian energy exports to facilitate global purchases. The Trump administration is also reportedly considering easing sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet tankers, allowing them to more freely (and likely more cheaply) trade oil.17 These moves likely aim to lower domestic diesel prices and global oil prices ahead of the U.S. midterm elections.

Oil Price Impacts: It is unclear whether U.S. efforts to facilitate Russian diesel exports will meaningfully decrease domestic or global fuel prices. Russia has been unable to meet domestic diesel demand since May 2026 due to Ukraine’s coordinated campaign targeting Russian energy revenues and is therefore unlikely to meet its U.S. commitments, especially amid resumed Ukrainian targeting. Ukraine will likely also extend its targeting of Russian delivery vessels, likely reducing the benefit of lifting sanctions on those vessels as well. Even if fully delivered, Russia’s promised 4.8 million tons of diesel cover roughly 10 days of U.S. demand and just over one day of global demand, with estimates showing the initial shipments would cut wholesale prices by only USD 1–2 per barrel.18

U.S.-Ukraine Relations: These developments have likely pushed U.S.-Ukraine relations to a low point. Zelenskyy condemned the diesel deal and has criticized the possibility of further sanctions relief for Russia. The two countries have experienced periods of both cooperation and strain since the Trump administration took office in January 2025, indicating this downturn is unlikely to have a lasting impact. In the near term, public disputes between the two governments and possible delays to weapons shipments or technology transfers are expected.

Winter Campaign: The upcoming winter is likely to be the most difficult of the war to date, particularly for Ukraine. Russia has already begun its annual campaign to degrade living conditions and use harsh weather against the civilian population in Ukraine, having stepped up attacks on the capital of Kyiv in both September and early October. Air strikes are already causing power cuts and disrupting water supplies. On October 8, Mayor Vitali Klitschko advised residents to consider leaving the city temporarily over the winter, as conditions are expected to worsen.19 Russia has also shifted towards using jet-powered Geran drones, which are more difficult to shoot down than the older piston engine models. This technological advancement has led to more frequent and deadly strikes on Kyiv, which will likely continue through the winter. Russia has also stockpiled an estimated 700 ballistic missiles, which it will almost certainly use to target energy infrastructure this winter.20 Ukraine is already facing a critical shortage of Patriot interceptors, which will likely reduce its ability to combat Russian ballistic missile strikes this winter.21

Conservative Bloc Likely to Win Spanish Snap Election on November 29, 2026

On November 29, 2026, Spain will hold a snap election projected to favor the country’s conservative bloc. Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez of the Spanish Worker’s Party (PSOE) has faced intense scrutiny over his government’s handling of corruption, immigration, and housing crises. Polling indicates the conservative Popular Party (PP) and the further right Vox party will together secure enough votes to form a majority coalition government, with the PP likely leading if post-election negotiations succeed.22

The progressive coalition parties, by contrast, are unlikely to reach an agreement before election day. The PSOE retains substantial support across Spain and is expected to remain the leading opposition force. Polls indicate the PSOE will win 107 seats compared to the PP’s 133 seats, leaving it well short of a majority.23

Corruption: High-profile corruption cases involving Sanchez’s wife, brother, and former top party allies have likely damaged voter confidence. Some of these individuals have been jailed or face imprisonment over corruption charges.24

Immigration: Immigration grievances intensified in late July 2026 when over 70,000 migrants arrived in Spain’s enclave city, Ceuta. Vox has long campaigned on strict immigration policies and has likely gained stronger support because of this stance. The party is expected to double its seats this election cycle from 33 to 66, establishing itself as the third political force in Spain.25

Housing: A perceived housing crisis has dominated Spain’s political landscape and prompted Sanchez to call for a snap election. His government failed to pass housing legislation in Congress amid strong public opposition fueled by cost-of-living complaints and the high-profile eviction of an elderly woman.2627

France and European Protests

Major protests have swept France since mid-October and are expected to continue into November. The movement began in September, when students blocked schools to protest inadequate education funding and resources. As momentum built, other groups joined the demonstrations, focusing largely on France’s high cost of living. The gilets jaunes (yellow vests), a movement that emerged in 2018 around farmer protests against diesel prices,28 have likely regained prominence due to their ability to mobilize large numbers and their focus on cost-of-living issues.

Political Paralysis: Protests in France are almost certainly a symptom of a political system that is unable to respond to the demands of either the populace or external actors (such as the EU and financial markets). France’s parliamentary landscape is fractured almost perfectly into thirds, split between the left, center, and right.29 With no group able to come close to a majority, it has almost certainly become difficult to achieve a mandate, making efforts to solve pressing issues—such as the country’s national deficit (which is dangerously close to breaching EU rules)—essentially impossible.30

Elections: The country will vote in a presidential election in May 2027, which has a roughly even chance of clarifying the balance of power and providing a mandate either to the left or the right.31 Until then, protests are likely to continue.

Protests Spread Elsewhere: While France is the key EU member facing protest movements, other European countries are also wrestling with cost-of-living issues, with France-inspired protests reported in Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal.32 Costs also typically rise in winter as energy is required to heat houses; the continued war in Ukraine has, in previous winters, resulted in elevated prices for fuel oil, which is almost certain to occur again this year.

Albanian Protests Likely to Continue in November 2026

During October 2026, student-led, anti-government demonstrations in Albania escalated into violent confrontations with police, almost certainly increasing pressure on Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government.33 On October 14, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Tirana over rising education costs, poor university conditions, limited employment opportunities, and allegations of government corruption. Demonstrators set fire to the Education Ministry and two bank branches, while police deployed tear gas and water cannons. The unrest continued through October 24, when protesters attacked the Agriculture Ministry and clashed with security forces, prompting police to use rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons.3435

Looking Forward: The demonstrations have expanded beyond student grievances into a broader anti-government movement demanding Rama’s resignation, very likely building on months of protests against a controversial coastal development project. The sustained unrest almost certainly presents a growing challenge to Rama, who secured a fourth term in 2025.36 Continued confrontations remain likely as protesters intensify their demands for Rama’s resignation. Furthermore, the electoral success of Serbia’s student-led movement on October 25 will likely further embolden Albanian demonstrators and strengthen calls for political change.

Americas

Mid-Terms

On November 3, 2026, the United States will hold mid-term elections to determine all 435 House seats and 35 Senate seats (including special elections in Florida and Ohio), along with 36 governorships. Republicans currently hold the Senate 53–47 and the House 218–213.37 National polling currently favors Democrats, with forecasters generally predicting a Democratic advantage in the House, while the Senate is rated much more competitive.38 Close Senate races are likely in Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Texas.

Results in close races are often not known on election night. Elections in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Arizona will likely take several days in close races, and California House races are typically not final for two to three weeks.39 Certification takes several days or weeks depending on state law.40 Control of one or both chambers will likely remain unknown on election night, either because several seats remain undecided or because the outcome hinges on a small number of narrow wins by either party. This is the highest-risk scenario for politically motivated violence and localized unrest, which would likely extend from November 3 through certification.

Risks: ZeroFox assesses that the risk of politically motivated violence and localized unrest around the election is elevated but likely depends more on the margin and speed of results than on which party wins. Fraud claims against specific jurisdictions are likely. A contested outcome—wherein control is undecided on election night or decided by a handful of narrow wins—is the highest-risk scenario for unrest. Legal challenges from either side are very likely, and localized unrest is likely for weeks through certification. Before Election Day, the main risk drivers are likely federal intervention at the polls, targeted violence against political figures, and lone-actor threats linked to the U.S.-Iran war.

Challenging the Results: Both the Republican and Democratic parties are very likely to pursue legal challenges, recount requests, and certification disputes. Protests at county election offices, count facilities, and state capitols over undecided races, as well as confrontations between opposing observers and protesters, are likely. Large, sustained demonstrations in major cities have a roughly even chance of occurring if interference allegations are documented and widely shared.

Protests: Protests would most likely be concentrated in county election offices and count centers in undecided races—particularly in slower-counting Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Arizona41—as well as at state capitols, federal buildings, jurisdictions already targeted by federal action, and cities with recent federal enforcement tension.

Asia

APEC Summit November 18–19

The APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting will convene in Shenzhen, China, November 18–19, with the CEO Summit preceding it November 17–18. President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to meet during the conference. The meeting almost certainly carries particular significance given ongoing disputes over tariffs, technology and artificial intelligence controls, rare-earth minerals, agricultural trade, and market access.

Chinese authorities are reportedly enhancing security measures and increasing logistics capacity as speculation grows about the attendance of Xi, Trump, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Shenzhen will experience heightened security controls, traffic restrictions, limited access around key venues, and intensified scrutiny of travelers and business activity throughout the summit period.42

U.S.-China Tensions: In late September 2026, the United States and China agreed to extend their existing trade truce by two months, moving its expiration from November 10 to January 10. The announced extension very likely reduces the immediate risk of renewed tariff escalation but was for a shorter time period than even pessimistic estimates predicted (three to six months), very likely signaling how little progress was made on key issues involving critical minerals export controls, advanced technology, Taiwan, and tariffs.43 However, the extension itself very likely reflects a mutual desire to avoid a repeat of 2025, when U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods exceeded 100 percent, and China imposed strict export controls on critical minerals. In essence, the two sides agreed to extend talks, despite agreeing on very little. Aside from the November APEC summit, the United States will host the Group of 20 summit in Miami in December, with both Xi and Trump expected to attend, providing the most likely venue for further engagement before the January 2027 expiration.44 The fact that the trade truce was extended beyond those two summits makes it unlikely a deal will be announced at them; it is more likely the leaders will attend those summits for further discussion opportunities.

Ukraine: A trilateral meeting involving President Putin over the war in Ukraine is also likely. Putin reportedly suggested discussing the war in Ukraine and broader U.S.-Russia economic relations.45 A major development on the war is unlikely to come from the summit.

Taiwan 2026 Local Elections

On November 28, 2026, Taiwan will hold local elections across six special municipalities and 16 counties and cities to elect county magistrates, city mayors, county and city councilors, and township mayors. Elected officials will serve four-year terms. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which won the 2024 presidential election, will compete against the Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party that holds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).46 The mayorship race in the largest city of Taipei will likely have a meaningful impact on the 2028 presidential election.

Mainland Chinese Influence: China-related influence operations have emerged as a significant security threat during Taiwan’s election period. The National Security Bureau reported that China-originated false and disputed online content surged 48 percent year-on-year during the first nine months of 2026, totaling more than 2.5 million items. Election candidates and critical policy areas that included energy, food security, and defense were primary targets of these campaigns. The bureau also documented an average of 2.58 million cyberattacks against Taiwanese government agencies daily.47

Africa

Ethiopia: Fighting Between the TPLF and Federal Forces Continues, Regional War Risk Persists

Clashes between the newly formed Alliance for Survival (AFS) rebel group and the Ethiopian government are likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Ethiopia concluded a civil war between the central government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) who lead the AFS, which ended in 2022. The current conflict reveals several key trends. Tigrayan forces are likely more divided and less capable than they have been historically. Ethiopian forces are likely stronger than in the previous conflict. On October 4, 2026, Ethiopian federal forces and allied fighters captured Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray region.48

However, the latest fighting demonstrates Ethiopia’s relative isolation—a stark reversal from the earlier conflict when Tigrayan forces lacked external allies. This time, neighboring Eritrea is supporting the rebels after aiding Ethiopia in the previous conflict. Representatives from the rebel regions of Tigray, Afar, and Amhara met with the presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan on October 4 in Egypt.49 All four nations have strained relations with Ethiopia and demonstrated their support for the rebels. However, Ethiopia is not entirely isolated; its more sophisticated fighting force likely owes much to military support from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Wider War: Ethiopia’s western neighbor, Sudan, is also involved in a violent civil war, with reports of both Ethiopian and Tigrayan forces fighting on opposite sides. If uncontrollable violence erupts in Ethiopia, it would likely have serious economic impacts across the region and bring in foreign powers such as the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which have been battling for influence in the vital Red Sea and Horn of Africa area.50

Regionalization: Ethiopia has several large regions, and the Tigray region is known for its battle-hardened local militias that dominated Ethiopian politics for decades until the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018. Since then, several PMs have sought to gain more authority for the central government over the extent of state rights, an issue that likely provoked the initial war. The central government managed to win the war only after foreign intervention helped reverse gains made by the TPLF, who nearly took the capital, Addis Ababa.51 The confluence of regions fighting alongside each other against the government likely signals dissatisfaction with the central government’s efforts to consolidate power. TPLF likely seeks to regain lost territory and power from the civil war, while the other rebel groups similarly likely resist the central government’s efforts to assert control over Ethiopia’s powerful regional governments.

South Africa Local Elections November 4

On November 4, 2026, South Africans will vote in municipal elections amid voter frustration over poor service delivery, unstable local government coalitions, migration, and rising costs. According to the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), special voting will take place on November 2 and November 3.52 The Democratic Alliance (DA) opposition party is reportedly closing the gap with African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s largest political party. The latest polling placed the DA at 28.4 percent–1.2 percentage points behind the ANC with 29.6 percent.53

Changing Politics: The ANC has almost certainly been South Africa’s most influential political party since the end of apartheid in the mid-1990s, while the DA is reportedly perceived as closer to the powerful white minority. However, years of perceived economic mismanagement and corruption within the ANC have very likely eroded its political dominance. In recent polls, the DA leads in South Africa’s largest cities. In Johannesburg, the DA commands above 30 percent support compared to the ANC’s above 20 percent, likely opening the door to a coalition between the two parties. In Cape Town, the DA is likely to retain its majority, which it has held since 2006. In Ekurhuleni, ANC support is projected to fall, giving the DA a roughly even chance of gaining power. Buffalo City likely remains the ANC’s strongest metropolitan stronghold.54

Anti-Immigration Sentiment: Ahead of the election, South Africa’s joint police-military operation, Operation Prosper, has worked to suppress anti-immigrant violence, particularly in Durban. The violence was fueled by a misinformation campaign following a court ruling on asylum seekers issued on October 8, 2026.55 Troops from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will reportedly remain on standby to support police operations through November 30, 2026.56

  1. Report Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide monthly updates on significant geopolitical occurrences and logistics developments, as well as potential impacts to the global supply chain. ↩︎
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