U.S. Counter-Narcotic Actions in Latin America

Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has likely begun shifting its national security focus towards Latin America, prioritizing the fight against increasingly militarized drug cartels as other global security threats to the United States have reportedly lessened. This shift is marked by recent military actions, including a strike on a suspected Venezuelan drug vessel and the deployment of naval forces to the South Caribbean. The Trump administration views Venezuela as a key player in drug transit and one of the countries most responsible for the lawlessness that has spread across the region in the last five years. 

The U.S. State and Defense Departments are likely asking allied states to provide the most obvious on-the-ground military presence, with U.S. troops focused on reconnaissance, intelligence, and surveillance capabilities. However, it is unclear how even a limited U.S. military presence will be interpreted by the host countries or if those host countries can convince the Trump administration they have the military capabilities required to control the threat.

Details

On September 2, 2025, the U.S. military carried out a strike in the South Caribbean on a vessel reportedly transporting drugs from Venezuela, killing 11 suspected members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, which the White House recently labeled a terrorist organization. U.S. President Donald Trump announced the operation, calling it part of his administration’s broader crackdown on drug cartels.¹

The military maneuvers in the South Caribbean mark the first kinetic uses of U.S. naval forces there since the Trump administration reportedly signed a secret directive for the military to take counter-narcotic actions in the region. This is the first significant movement of U.S. troops and the Navy to the Latin American region in decades. It follows major developments in U.S. efforts to counter transnational drug cartels in Latin America, as well as escalations in Venezuelan-U.S. tensions, and indicates a concerted effort to establish a more long-term operational posture within the region. 

• On July 25, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department designated a Venezuelan-based criminal group known as Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This follows the designation of eight other Latin American organized crime groups as FTOs, including Tren de Aragua (Venezuela) and the Sinaloa Cartel (Mexico).²
• On August 8, President Trump reportedly signed a directive to the DoD to begin using military troops in enforcement operations against certain Latin American drug cartels.³
• On August 15, Trump ordered the deployment of spy planes, warships, and submarines to the Southern Caribbean Sea, reportedly to address the “growing threat posed by” drug cartels.⁴ Additional announcements followed in subsequent weeks regarding sending 4,000 more troops to the region, along with more naval ships, and a deployment off the coast of Venezuela.^5,6

These counter-narcotic actions in Latin America likely reflect findings in the U.S. Intelligence Community’s (IC) annual threat assessment, a yearly ranking of threats aligned with the President's priorities. The IC’s assessment was released in March 2025 and ranked “Foreign illicit Drug Actors” as a primary threat to U.S. national security.⁷ 

They also support the Trump administration’s approach to tackling the rise of fentanyl and drug cartel operations within the United States—a key justification for implementing tariff actions and escalating other policy measures.^8,9

• The Trump administration has repeatedly expressed interest in regaining control of the Panama Canal, where the United States accounts for 40 percent of all container traffic.¹⁰
• The administration has also sought to aggressively counter China’s regional influence, which the United States and its allies fear is bolstering authoritarian governments (such as those in Cuba and Venezuela) and seeking to isolate the United States.¹¹
• Thus far, the administration has adopted a hardline approach in the region, leveraging economic measures to compel change. The beginning of Trump’s second term saw the imposition of sanctions on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.¹² Tariffs have also been both widely and directly imposed on Latin American countries. The United States has also utilized these measures to influence countries' domestic policies, such as by increasing tariffs on Brazil for its prosecution of previous President Jair Bolsonaro.¹³

At the time of writing, reports indicate that seven U.S. warships, amphibious groups carrying 4,500 marines and sailors, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, 10 F-35 fighter jets (deployed to Puerto Rico), and spy planes are either in the region or expected to arrive soon.^14,15

A Change in U.S. Strategic Priorities  

These military actions come at a time when threats elsewhere are widely considered to have diminished. The locational shift of American troops will likely come at the expense of the U.S. military presence elsewhere—notably in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia Pacific region.

• Russia’s inability to take more than 20 percent of Ukraine (a significantly weaker military) after three years of fighting has demonstrated it is no longer the security threat to Europe it once was. Furthermore, NATO states have committed to spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense in the coming years; consequently, the European defense sector will likely be in a considerably stronger position in the coming years to manage the Russian threat with a more limited U.S. military presence.
• In the Middle East, Iran’s network of proxies across the region has been significantly degraded in the last two years. Since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Israel has significantly degraded Hamas’ capabilities in Gaza and Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, while also degrading Iran’s air defenses, nuclear program, and ballistic missile program. Together, the U.S. allied states of Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia can likely take on more military responsibility in the region.
• The United States will likely continue to maintain a large security buffer in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the region is also home to U.S. allies such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines; these nations have grown closer to the U.S. militarily and have considerably improved their defense sectors in recent years. Therefore, the risk from China against the U.S. mainland is likely contained.

These threat reductions likely allow for a strategic shift away from military engagements in these regions to a closer sphere of influence in Latin America, reflecting a key foreign policy interest of the Trump administration.

The Rise of Drug Trafficking Through Latin America  

Drug cartels have become increasingly dominant and organized throughout the Latin American region, with record profits and all-time highs in production coming from the cocaine and fentanyl trade.¹⁶ A series of reports have linked cartels to other illicit ventures, such as illegal gold mining, extortion, migrant smuggling, and trafficking of endangered species.¹⁷ 

• As cartels have expanded from drug-smuggling to controlling territory and other revenue streams, they have become increasingly militarized, posing a broader security threat.
• Some of the larger cartels have become so powerful that they now have the ability to challenge state governments and therefore present a wider security threat to the United States.

While Latin America has consistently endured drug-related violence in places like Colombia and Mexico, high murder rates in Brazil and Venezuela, and gang-related activity in Central America, the last five years have seen a new level of lawlessness spread across the region, especially in places with historically low crime rates. 

Countries such as Costa Rica,¹⁸ Uruguay,¹⁹ Chile,²⁰ and Ecuador have seen major increases in violence and crime, as they are now used as transit hubs for drug redistribution to new markets throughout Europe, Oceania, Asia, and Africa.²¹

• Ecuador has steadily moved from one of the region's safest countries to one of its most dangerous as drug-trafficking groups (who control the transport of drugs from neighboring Peru and Colombia) began fighting violent turf wars. Despite numerous states of emergency, Ecuador’s crime rate remains elevated, with the government limited in its ability to control the expansion of the drug trade.²²
• In Mexico, cartels control a growing share of the economy, including parts of the energy and food trade; critics say this is an effort by the government to avoid antagonizing the cartels into even larger acts of violence.²³ Previous efforts to control cartel expansion have failed, as the lengthy process requires rooting out corrupt officials while maintaining morale as violence escalates.
• Colombian cocaine trade reached unprecedented levels in 2023, with production, seizures, and consumption hitting historic highs; along with this rise came an increase in violence, which continues to the present.²⁴ Multiple attacks have occurred as recently as last month—including six killed in a car bomb in Cali and 12 in a drone attack against a helicopter in Medellin—leading to martial law being declared in Cali, the third most populous city in Colombia.²⁵
• Costa Rica saw the most violent year in the country’s history in 2023, with 900 homicides primarily attributed to narcotrafficking groups.²⁶ Costa Rica is on track to break that record again in 2025, with 500 homicides already recorded between January 1 and July 28, 2025.²⁷ U.S. Embassy officials in Costa Rica have reported that the main causes of rise are cocaine consumption, corruption, and increased gang competition in the country.²⁸ As a result, Costa Rica has begun to transform from a relatively safe country to an increasingly violent one.

Venezuela

U.S. Department of State reports indicate that Venezuela is at the center of this regional rise in crime. In an interview on August 12, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlined his position that Venezuela has an illegitimate government wherein the Cartel de los Soles, run by the Venezuelan military, allows drug runners to move through Venezuela and utilize military facilities.²⁹ Rubio claims that Venezuelan President Nicolás  Maduro heads the cartel, along with other high-ranking Venezuelan individuals who provide material support to FTOs, threatening peace and security in the United States.³⁰

• Bordering Colombia, Venezuela has reportedly become one of the principal transit nations, sending cocaine into the Caribbean and across to West Africa, Europe, and the United States.
• Tren de Aragua has become one of the fastest-expanding and most violent gangs in the region, as well as a key player in transit operations. The gang has rapidly expanded its operations across Latin America and has diversified into human smuggling and money laundering. The group has created a strong base in Venezuela—particularly in Maracay, Aragua, where Tren de Aragua reportedly controls schools, justice, and even how citizens’ homes are painted and decorated.³¹ 

Maduro’s government has been reported to be complicit with these operations, through a profitable relationship between government security forces and the cartels.³² Reports indicate that the government supports the transit of narcotics through Venezuela and, in some cases, provides further assistance in the transportation to other countries. 

Gun Boat Diplomacy More Likely than Regime Change 

The Trump administration has stated that the aim of the August 15 U.S. deployment of spy planes, warships, and submarines to the Southern Caribbean Sea is to combat drug cartels; however, on August 7, the Justice and State Departments announced that the U.S. government will double its reward (to USD 50 million) for any information leading to the arrest of President Maduro, whom they have indicted on drug-trafficking charges.³³ This has led to accusations that the United States intends to use its military deployment to oust President Maduro from power, under the guise of countering drug trafficking; critics have likened the situation to the military buildup that led to the invasion of Panama and the extraction of General Manuel Noriega in 1989.³⁴

In response to the naval deployment, President Maduro gave his first international press conference in more than a year to claim the United States “is seeking regime change through military threat.”³⁵ This has led to a heightened security state in Venezuela and increased tensions between the two nations.  

• The deployment of the U.S. Navy has triggered the mobilization of 4.5 million Venezuelan militiamen in response to what the Venezuela government claims are threats by the United States, drones and ships to northwest Venezuela, and 15,000 troops to the nation's border.^36,37

However, a U.S. military intervention to capture Maduro remains unlikely, whether by ground invasion or smaller operation. Preparations have been made for a strong U.S. presence within the region, but a direct intervention would likely require a much more significant physical build-up of forces. Maduro has used this opportunity to rally his country through several speeches against the perceived threat, putting Venezuelans on high alert.³⁸ If the Trump administration’s aim is to apply pressure to remove Maduro or to directly intervene, then the DoD would likely have stationed more troops without telegraphing its intentions.

A more plausible alternative is a classic case of “gunboat diplomacy”: attempting to influence Venezuela’s domestic landscape through a show of force and blockade of narco-trafficking routes. This aligns with the recent U.S. strike on the suspected drug boat. This aggressive U.S. posture towards drug trafficking signals to other cartels and countries a willingness to use non-judicial force in the pursuit of the Trump administration’s goals. Applying a “maximalist” zero-tolerance policy on all drug trafficking from Venezuela puts significant pressure on not only the cartels but also the government, which the United States reportedly sees as directly profiting from the transit.

The Future of U.S. Military Operations in the Region

Reception has been mixed to the U.S. presence in the region; Brazil and Colombia have warned of the potential for destabilization, while others such as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago have responded positively to the moves.³⁹

• On August 26, Argentina added Cartel de los Soles to its terrorism crime registry⁴⁰ after a similar declaration by several other countries, including Paraguay⁴¹ and Ecuador.⁴² Countries like Argentina are signaling their willingness to provide support to the U.S. effort; however, Ecuador is likely telegraphing its hope for direct U.S. support to handle a security crisis the country is incapable of addressing on its own.

The military capabilities of these Latin American countries remain limited, and the major U.S. deployment is very likely a reflection of the Trump administration's belief that other leading countries in the region need assistance in order to handle the security threat.

It is currently unclear what U.S. military action will look like in practice and how it will be interpreted by the host country. In some cases (such as in Ecuador, Haiti, or smaller Caribbean nations being used as trafficking points), robust military action will likely be welcomed. 

• The United States is likely coordinating with allied states through intelligence and reconnaissance; however, it is unclear if even the larger states in the region have enough resources to be reliable military partners. In these cases, there is a possibility that the United States may intervene more directly through a boots-on-the-ground military presence.
• Both Trinidad and Tobago and Curacao have welcomed the deployment of U.S. troops. The Prime Minister of Curacao has stated that U.S. warships are expected to arrive in the country. Trinidad and Tobago has also stated it will allow American forces to use its territory if Venezuela were to attack neighboring Guyana.⁴³

Further military activity within the South Caribbean is expected as the United States continues its deployment and pressure campaign against Latin American cartels. The Trump administration is likely to attempt to disrupt drug-trafficking operations throughout the Caribbean islands, which have reportedly become a major drug transit springboard into both the United States and Europe. 

• This includes U.S. focus on ports where cartels have established a stronghold and shipbuilding operations to increase trafficking capabilities. This may be in the form of direct U.S. military action or supporting roles to law enforcement.

Further tensions may escalate with Venezuela as pressure increases from the United States, with the potential for disputes over sovereign waters and spillover into other countries in the region. Limited operations into territorial land remain a possibility; however, the acts will likely cause diplomatic backlash over sovereignty issues, and there is a high risk of a major escalation. Therefore, the U.S. DoD will most likely prioritize other avenues to disrupt cartel operations. In any case, the Trump administration has signaled a desire to maintain a more long-term strategic presence in the region, which can be expected to continue throughout the coming months.

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1. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/americas/us-military-kills-11-people-strike-alleged-drug-boat-venezuela-trump-says-2025-09-03/
2. hXXps://www.ft[.]com/content/ecf6cb9c-36d8-4ad4-9778-b13ef7a20a11
3. hXXps://www.nytimes[.]com/2025/08/08/us/trump-military-drug-cartels.html
4. hXXps://www.dailymail[.]co[.]uk/news/article-15002131/US-deploys-forces-Caribbean-Sea-cartels.html
5. hXXps://edition.cnn[.]com/2025/08/15/politics/us-military-deploying-caribbean-latin-america-cartel-mission
6. hXXps://apnews[.]com/article/trump-venezuela-destroyers-maduro-drug-cartels-e33794ebc24d9031e536d132ce205b4c
7. hXXps://www.dni[.]gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf
8. hXXps://www.bbc[.]co[.]uk/news/articles/cy5ng663d1wo
9. Ibid.
10. hXXps://www.cfr[.]org/article/who-controls-panama-canal
11. hXXps://www.cfr[.]org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri#chapter-title-0-7
12. Ibid.
13. hXXps://www.foreignaffairs[.]com/united-states/trumps-collision-course-brazil
14. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/us/us-builds-up-forces-caribbean-officials-experts-ask-why-2025-08-29/
15. hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/americas/trump-plays-down-possible-regime-change-venezuela-us-deploys-stealth-fighter-2025-09-05/
16. hXXps://www.unodc[.]org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf
17. hXXps://www.ft[.]com/content/dc6b17fc-ba19-47b7-8a54-a7216356bf47
18. hXXps://insightcrime[.]org/news/costa-rica-ecuador-criminal/
19. hXXps://insightcrime[.]org/news/uruguay-faces-rising-threat-organized-crime/
20. hXXps://insightcrime[.]org/news/interview/ex-intel-official-explains-chiles-organized-crime-explosion/
21. hXXps://www.riskintelligence[.]eu/analyst-briefings/the-resurgence-of-the-south-america-to-west-africa-maritime-route-for-cocaine-trafficking
22. hXXps://www.smartraveller[.]gov[.]au/destinations/americas/ecuador
23. ZeroFox Intelligence Brief: Continuity Likely After Mexico Elections, May 29, 2024
24. hXXps://www.aa[.]com[.]tr/en/americas/global-cocaine-trade-hits-record-highs-driven-by-colombian-surge-unodc/3614816
25. hXXps://www.infobae[.]com/colombia/2025/08/22/gustavo-petro-declararia-la-conmocion-interior-en-el-suroccidente-del-pais-tras-atentado-a-base-aerea-en-cali-en-que-consiste-la-medida/
26. hXXps://cronkitenews.azpbs[.]org/2024/10/18/costa-rica-face-record-breaking-levels-crime-tourists/
27. hXXps://ticotimes[.]net/2025/07/29/costa-rica-surpasses-500-homicides-as-gang-violence-escalates
28. hXXps://cronkitenews.azpbs[.]org/2024/10/18/costa-rica-face-record-breaking-levels-crime-tourists/
29. hXXps://www.state[.]gov/releases/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-sid-rosenberg-of-sid-and-friends-in-the-morning/
30. hXXps://home.treasury[.]gov/news/press-releases/sb0207
31. hXXps://smallwarsjournal[.]com/2025/06/12/crossing-borders-the-evolution-and-impact-of-tren-de-aragua/
32. hXXps://www.nytimes[.]com/2025/09/03/world/americas/venezuela-drug-boat-trump-us.html
33. hXXps://www.thetimes[.]com/world/latin-america/article/maduro-venezuela-us-military-intervention-pz7vbn0rp
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. hXXps://www.cbsnews[.]com/news/venezuela-nicolas-maduro-deploying-militia-us-threats/
37. hXXps://anewz[.]tv/world/world-news/12378/venezuela-deploys-15000-troops-to-colombia-border/news
38. hXXps://www.bloomberg[.]com/news/articles/2025-08-22/maduro-rallies-venezuela-militias-before-us-warships-arrival
39. hXXps://www.bloomberg[.]com/news/newsletters/2025-09-03/trump-s-gunboat-diplomacy-takes-aim-at-venezuela-s-maduro
40. hXXps://www.batimes[.]com[.]ar/news/argentina/mileis-argentina-adds-cartel-de-los-soles-to-terrorism-crime-registry.phtml
41. hXXps://en.mercopress[.]com/2025/08/22/paraguay-declares-cartel-de-los-soles-a-terrorist-organization
42. hXXps://en.mercopress[.]com/2025/08/15/ecuador-declares-cartel-de-los-solas-a-terrorist-group
43. hXXps://www.latintimes[.]com/country-40-miles-venezuela-says-us-warships-will-arrive-matter-days-588858